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Chapter 5 
Summary and Discussion 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter first provides a summary of the findings of the three empirical 
studies included in this dissertation. Subsequently, the conclusions and 
implications are presented. This is followed by a discussion of potential 
limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 
 
5.2 Summary of the empirical studies 
 
This dissertation consists of three empirical studies on audit quality. Each of 
the three studies uses data from the Belgian market for audit services. 
Belgium is an appropriate setting for these studies because of its unique 
characteristics which enable the construction of complete client portfolios at 
the audit firm, the local office, and the audit partner level. 
The first study, discussed in chapter 2, investigates whether audit firms 
use audit partner expertise as a risk management strategy. Audit firms are 
expected to allocate audit partners based on the expertise of the audit 
partners and the risk characteristics of the clients for two reasons. First of all, 
audit standards require the engagement partner to be assured that the audit 
engagement team has a sufficient amount of experience with clients of a 
similar nature (ISA 220.A11). The engagement partner is the leader of the 
audit team, and his experience can be expected to be an important aspect of 
the overall required experience level of the engagement team. Second, from 
a risk management perspective, audit firms are required to sufficiently 
manage client risks, since a single audit failure can have a significant impact 
on the profitability and reputation of an entire audit firm.  
However, despite the benefits of using audit partner expertise as a risk 
management strategy, audit firms may fail to use it effectively for three 
reasons. First of all, the large variation in client characteristics and partner 
expertise levels makes the allocation of audit partners to clients a complex 
task (Dopuch et al. 2003). Second, more experienced audit partners may 
use their power within the audit firm to avoid being allocated to more risky 
clients because they may be held personally accountable in case of audit 
failure or litigation. Third, less experienced audit partners may be under 
pressure to expand their client portfolios due to career concerns. Hence, less 
experienced auditors may be willing to audit those clients that experienced 
audit partners are not interested in.  
The study examines whether audit partner expertise is used as a risk 
management strategy for three commonly distinguished risk categories 
(Huss and Jacobs 1991): audit risk, client business risk, and auditor 
business risk. Furthermore, two components of auditor expertise are 
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examined: general partner experience and industry experience. The results, 
based on an analysis of clients to which a new audit partner was allocated, 
show that general audit partner experience is used as a risk management 
strategy for auditor business risk. Furthermore, evidence shows that partner 
industry experience is used to manage audit risk. No evidence is found that 
audit firms allocate partners with greater expertise to clients with higher 
client business risk. Overall, the results discussed in chapter 2 suggest that 
audit firms use audit partner expertise to manage audit risk and auditor 
business risk, but not client business risk. 
The second study, discussed in chapter 3, examines the effect of auditor-
client economic bonding on audit quality. Audit fees may contribute to an 
economic bond between the auditor and the client. A strong auditor-client 
economic bond may impair the independence of the auditor, resulting in 
lower audit quality. However, auditors also face litigation and reputation 
costs in case of an audit failure. These costs are positively associated with 
client size. Reputation and litigation costs may therefore induce auditors to 
remain independent from clients that provide high audit fees (Reynolds and 
Francis 2001). 
The off-setting effect of reputation and litigation costs on auditor-client 
economic bonding may however be limited to the audit firm level, since the 
benefits of audit fees mainly accrue to the local audit office or audit partner, 
whereas litigation and reputation costs are shared by the audit firm. Hence, 
there may be a moral hazard problem in which audit partners make 
decisions to maximize their own utility as opposed to firm value. 
Furthermore, clients are more likely to contribute to a significant source of 
revenue for a local office or audit partner, than for an audit firm. Hence, it is 
more likely that auditor-client economic bonding impairs auditor 
independence at the local office level or audit partner level rather than at the 
audit firm level office (Reynolds and Francis 2001). The study therefore 
measures auditor-client economic bonding at three levels of analysis: the 
audit firm level, the local office level, and the audit partner level.  
Furthermore, the study distinguishes between clients that engage in 
upward earnings management and clients that engage in downward 
earnings management. Tax authorities are more likely to scrutinize the 
financial statements of companies that manage earnings downwards than of 
companies that manage earnings upwards, since downward earnings 
management results in a reduction of taxable income. Fear that downward 
earnings management will be detected by the tax authorities may create 
incentives for auditors to be stricter in constraining downward earnings 
management than upward earnings management (Vander Bauwhede et al. 
2003). Given the relatively low litigious environment in Belgium, these 
differences in regard to the extent of public oversight create a setting in 
which can be examined whether reputation concerns are sufficient 
mechanism to ensure that audit quality is not compromised for clients on 
which auditors are economically dependent. Furthermore, it enables testing 
whether public oversight enhances audit quality. 
The results of the study show that high levels of auditor-client economic 
bonding increase the likelihood that auditors acquiesce to client pressure to 
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allow earnings management. This finding is however restricted to clients that 
manage their earnings upwards. Auditors do not give in to pressure from 
clients on which they are economically dependent to allow downward 
earnings management. This could imply that auditors may fear downward 
earnings management to be detected by the tax authorities (Vander 
Bauwhede et al. 2003), suggesting that public oversight is an important 
factor in maintaining audit quality. Furthermore, the results do not support 
the notion that problems related to auditor-client economic bonding are more 
likely to manifest at the local office level and audit partner level than at the 
audit firm level. A possible explanation lies in the fact that Belgian audit firms 
and local offices are relatively smal. Independence issues at the audit 
partner level are therefore likely to also result in independence issues at the 
local office level and audit firm level, implying that any differences in results 
between the three levels will be limited. 
The third empirical study, discussed in chapter 4, analyzes the 
association between competition on the market for audit services and audit 
quality. The market for audit services is commonly criticized to not be 
competitive because of the typically high market concentration levels (e.g. 
Government Accountability Office 2003; Financial Stability Forum 2006). A 
lack of competition is commonly argued to result in reduced audit quality 
(Yardley et al. 1992). However, it can be disputed whether high (static) 
concentration levels reflect a lack of competition (Buijink et al. 1998). 
Furthermore, while standard economic theory predicts a positive association 
between competition and quality on product markets, this prediction cannot 
be directly translated to the market for audit services because the audit 
industry is highly regulated and audit quality is not directly observable. 
Competition may result in reduced audit fees, which could reduce incentives 
for auditors to invest in quality, harming auditor competence and thereby 
lowering audit quality (Leland 1979; Kranton 2003). In addition, there may be 
a negative effect of competition on auditor independence, since lower audit 
fees may cause auditors to be dependent upon future audits of the same 
client to offset initial losses (DeAngelo 1981a). Reduced auditor competence 
and auditor independence will negatively affect audit quality (DeAngelo 
1981a).  
To test whether high concentration levels reflect limited competition, and 
to examine the association between competition on the market for audit 
services and audit quality, this study uses one measure of market 
concentration and two measures of competition. The Herfindahl index is 
used as a measure of market concentration. The first measure of 
competition is based on the market share mobility measure used by Buijink 
et al. (1998). The second measure of competition is a newly developed 
measure of competitor density, based on the geographical coordinates of all 
local audit offices and audit clients in Belgium. 
The empirical results show that audit quality proxied by the magnitude of 
absolute discretionary accruals is higher in more concentrated audit markets. 
Overall, the results based on the competition measures show that audit 
quality is positively associated with competition. This finding suggests that 
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high concentration levels do not necessarily reflect limited competition and 
that highly concentrated audit markets can still be competitive. 
 
 
5.3 Conclusions and implications 
 
The first study deals with the use of audit partner expertise as a risk 
management strategy. While audit firms are expected to benefit from 
allocating audit partners with the highest expertise to those clients that pose 
higher risks, the actual allocation might be too complex or may be hindered 
by audit partner incentives. The findings show that audit firms allocate audit 
partners with greater general experience to clients which pose a higher 
auditor business risk. Audit risk is managed by the allocation of partners with 
greater industry experience. However, no evidence is found that client 
business risk is managed using partner expertise. Even though it is possible 
that audit firms use alternative risk management strategies to manage this 
type of risk, auditors should examine whether client business risk is 
sufficiently managed as required by auditing standards (e.g. ISA 220.14; AU. 
312.02). Furthermore, it is worthwhile to investigate why audit partner 
expertise is not used as a risk management strategy for client business risk. 
Possible reasons relate to risk aversion of experienced audit partners and 
career pressure faced by less experienced audit partners. Pressure to 
develop their client portfolio might create incentives for less experienced 
partners to attract clients regardless of their risk characteristics. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the use of general partner 
experience as a risk management strategy is limited to auditor business risk. 
Although prior research has indicated that public listing status, a proxy for 
auditor business risk, is considered by auditors to reflect increased auditor 
business risk, auditors and regulators need to consider whether the 
allocation of experienced personnel to clients with a high auditor business 
risk is in fact the result of a risk management strategy. Alternatively, it could 
be explained by prestige and career perspectives associated with the audit 
of a listed client. This alternative explanation is a concern especially since 
the use of general audit partner experience as a risk management strategy is 
limited to auditor business risk. Hence, it is important for audit firms and 
regulators to consider whether audit partner experience is used by audit 
firms as a risk management strategy, and whether audit quality could benefit 
from ensuring that audit partners with more years of experience are 
allocated to clients with high audit risk and high client business risk. With 
respect to the current debate on fair value accounting and the need for audit 
partner expertise (e.g. IAASB 2008), the findings of this study suggest that 
auditors should consider what aspect of expertise (i.e. the number of years 
of experience or industry experience) is required for auditing judgments 
associated with fair value accounting. Furthermore, auditors and regulators 
need to ensure that guidelines and regulation are in place to ensure that the 
allocation of experts to engagements occurs in a manner in which audits can 
benefit most from audit partner expertise. 
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The results of the second study, which analyzes the effect of auditor-
client economic bonding on audit quality, suggest that high auditor-client 
economic bonding only induces auditors to acquiesce to client pressure to 
allow upward earnings management, not downward earnings management. 
This result can be explained by an increased fear by auditors that material 
misstatements will be detected by the tax authorities if clients engage in 
income decreasing, hence taxable income decreasing, earnings 
management. This result shows the importance of public oversight in 
maintaining audit quality, and adds to the current debate on the need for 
increased public oversight (e.g. Financial Stability Forum 2008; Basel 
Committee 2008). The results reported in the study are consistent across the 
three levels of analysis (i.e. the audit firm level, the local office level, and the 
audit partner level). This suggests that there is no moral hazard problem 
arising from the fact that reputation and litigation costs are carried by the 
entire firm, while the benefits related to the audits of single clients pertain 
mostly to individual audit partners and local audit offices. This may be due to 
the fact that audit firms in Belgium are relatively small. Conflicts of interests 
between individual audit partners and audit firms will be less prominent in 
smaller audit firms than in larger audit firms, because audit partners in small 
audit firms typically have a relatively larger interest in the audit firm. 
The third and final study examines the relationship between competition 
on the market for audit services and audit quality. The results of this study 
show that competition is positively associated with audit quality. This finding 
is in line with the positive effect of competition on quality suggested by 
standard economic theory. It is therefore important for regulators to ensure 
that the market for audit services remains competitive. The results also show 
a positive relationship between audit market concentration and audit quality. 
This finding therefore shows that high market concentration does not, by 
definition, reflect limited competition. It is important for regulators to take this 
into account to make certain that regulation is not merely aimed at lowering 
concentration levels. Although this study shows mixed findings regarding the 
effect of audit firm size on audit quality, the positive association between 
concentration levels and audit quality suggests that audit quality may be 
higher in more concentrated audit markets. Robustness checks conducted 
for the study show that the positive association between competition on the 
audit market and audit quality is limited to clients that engage in downward 
earnings management. No effect between competition and audit quality is 
found for clients that engage in upward earnings management. This finding 
is likely related to fear by auditors that downward earnings management will 
be detected by the tax authorities. This may induce auditors to be stricter in 
reducing downward earnings management than upward earnings 
management. This underlines the importance of public oversight in 
maintaining audit quality. 
Overall, the findings of this dissertation suggest that there are 
opportunities for the audit profession and audit regulators to enhance audit 
quality. With respect to the use of partner expertise as a risk management 
strategy, the results of the first study show that audit firms allocate audit 
partners with greater expertise to clients that have a higher audit risk and 
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clients that have a higher auditor business risk. However, no association is 
found between client business risk and audit partner expertise. While one 
explanation could be that alternative risk management strategies are more 
efficient at managing this type of risk, it is also possible that auditor partner 
expertise is not used as a risk management strategy due to risk aversion by 
auditor partners. Therefore, audit firms and regulators should focus on 
ensuring that the partner allocation process is effective since it reduces the 
risk that client risks are not sufficiently managed. Furthermore, the allocation 
of partners with greater expertise to risky clients results in a higher 
probability that material misstatements are detected by the auditor. Hence, it 
is important that auditors with high levels of expertise are allocated to clients 
with greater risk because this will have a positive impact on audit quality. 
With respect to auditor independence, the findings of the second study 
suggest that auditors may acquiesce to pressure by influential clients to 
allow earnings management. Hence, regulators and audit firms should focus 
on ensuring that auditors remain independent from their clients. 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that public oversight is an important factor 
in maintaining auditor independence. This adds to the current debate on 
whether public oversight is needed to enhance audit quality. With respect to 
competition, the third study shows that competition has a positive 
association with audit quality, but only for clients that engage in income 
reducing earnings management. This suggests that regulators need to 
ensure that the market for audit services remains competitive, because 
competition is positively associated with audit quality. Furthermore, the 
findings of the third study underline the importance of public oversight in 
maintaining audit quality. 
 
 
5.4 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
There are a number of limitations to this dissertation. Some are general 
limitations that relate to all three studies, while some specifically relate to an 
individual study. The first general limitation relates to the fact that audit fee 
data were not publicly available in Belgium at the time of the study. This 
limitation affects each of the three studies. As a result of this limitation, the 
first study is required to measure industry experience based on the sales 
revenues and total assets of the audit clients instead of audit fees. The 
second study measures auditor-client economic bonding based on client 
revenues instead of audit fees. Similarly, the measures of competition used 
in the third study are computed based on client asset data instead of audit 
fee data. However, the natural logarithms of client revenues and client 
assets are found to be highly correlated with audit fees (e.g. Francis 1984, 
Moizer and Turley 1987, Craswell et al. 1995, Reynolds and Francis 2001). 
In addition, the Belgian Institute of Auditors requires a direct relationship 
between the level of the audit fees and client characteristics. Every auditor 
has to report an overview of its clients, the audit fees and the amount of 
hours to the Belgian Institute of Auditors, who verify the appropriateness of 
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the audit fees. Therefore, the use of client revenues or client assets instead 
of audit fees does not seem to be a major concern. Although the proxies 
provide a reliable estimation of auditor-client economic bonding and relative 
market share distributions, they do not control for possible changes in the 
level of audit fees. Hence, it would be valuable to replicate these studies in a 
setting where regulators require both public and private companies to 
disclose audit fees.  
The second general limitation relates to the external validity of the stu-
dies. Belgium has a relatively low litigious environment compared to com-
monly used settings in audit research, such as the U.K. and the U.S. Even 
though prior research has shown that there are mechanisms other than 
litigation in place to ensure that audit quality is maintained at a sufficiently 
high level regardless of a relative lack of litigation (Gaeremynck and 
Willekens 2003), external validity of the results may be considered an issue. 
The implication of this lack of litigation for the findings of the first study is that 
it is even more likely for audit partner expertise to be used as a risk man-
agement strategy in more litigious environments where the possible impact 
of unmanaged risks is greater. Regarding the second study, it is possible 
that auditors would constrain downward earnings management even further 
in a high litigious environment than in a low litigious environment. In contrast 
to the reported findings related to upward earnings management, however, it 
is possible that auditors will not acquiesce to pressure from their most in-
fluential clients to allow upward earnings management in a setting with a 
higher risk of litigation. Future research could benefit from separately ex-
amining the effect of litigation and public oversight on the likelihood that au-
ditors acquiesce to client pressure to allow upward earnings management in 
more litigious environments. It is unclear whether the association between 
competition and audit quality would be different in a setting with relatively 
higher litigation risk (e.g. Chaney et al. 2003). 
In addition to these general limitations, there are a number of limitations 
specific to individual studies. A specific limitation to the first study is the use 
of public data. Because the study is based on public data, it is not possible to 
control for all alternative risk management strategies that audit firms may 
use. To overcome this problem, the study uses a sample in which most of 
the other risk management strategies are unlikely to be used, and in which 
the use of partner expertise as a risk management strategy is most likely to 
occur. However, it would be worthwhile for future research to simultaneously 
examine the different risk management strategies that audit firms can use to 
manage client risk, as well as the extent to which audit firms use different 
risk management strategies based on different client risk characteristics. 
The use of public data results in an additional limitation for the first study. 
The measures of risk used in this study are based on public data as opposed 
to private data, which may potentially provide more accurate estimations of 
client risk. Private data, however, might be biased by auditor judgments. The 
use of public data to measure client risk does therefore not necessarily result 
in a less reliable measure of risk than a measure of risk based on private 
data. 
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A limitation related to the third study is that the local markets in this study 
are defined based on the geographical locations of client and audit partners 
and an arguably arbitrary cut-off. Although robustness checks show that the 
results variations in the cut-off distance do not affect the results in any sig-
nificant way, it is still worthwhile for future research to study the association 
between competition and audit quality using differently defined local audit 
markets. 
The final limitation, which also affects the third study, relates to the 
measure of local competition developed in this study. This measure is 
developed at the audit partner level. It therefore implicitly assumes that audit 
partners working for the same audit firm also compete for clients. 
Competition amongst partners that are employed at the same audit firm is 
however likely to be very limited. Although sensitivity tests suggest that this 
issue does not have a significant impact on the results, it would be valuable 
if future research could develop a measure of local competition which takes 
local office capacity in account, as well as the limited competition amongst 
audit partners that work for the same audit firm. 
Finally, there is one additional suggestion for future research. Belgian 
audits are based on three year renewable contracts, referred to as man-
dates. Auditors might be more likely to acquiesce to client pressure to allow 
earnings management in the last year of the mandate than in the prior two 
years in the hope of renewing the contract for an additional three year. 
Hence, audit quality is possibly lower during the last year of the mandate 
than during the first two years of the mandate. However, no relationship be-
tween the year of the mandate and earnings quality was observed. Future 
research could analyze data on the subsequent fiscal year to examine 
whether more earnings management discretion was given to clients that 
subsequently switched to another audit firm, because the auditor might have 
been under pressure to allow client earnings management in order to 
increase the likelihood of mandate renewal. Because of data restrictions 
caused by the need to measure auditor tenure, the study did not analyze 
whether clients switching to another audit firm in the subsequent year 
showed increased earnings management behavior during the year prior to 
the switch. 
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Summary in Dutch 
Nederlandse Samenvatting 
 
 
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt drie verschillende onderwerpen. Het eerste empi-
rische stuk bestudeert of accountantskantoren gebruik maken van expertise 
van partners om risico‟s te beheersen die verbonden zijn aan accountants-
controles. Het tweede empirische stuk onderzoekt of economische 
afhankelijkheid van klanten de kwaliteit van accountantscontroles beïnvloedt. 
Het derde en laatste empirische stuk analyseert of de mate van concurrentie 
tussen accountants van invloed is op de kwaliteit van accountantscontroles. 
Aangezien accountants, zoals aangetoond door Simunic en Stein (1990), 
hun complete klantenbestand in beschouwing nemen bij het nemen van 
beslissingen met betrekking tot individuele klanten is het van belang voor de 
empirische onderzoeken in dit proefschrift om gebruik te maken van een 
dataset waarin volledige portfolio‟s van klanten beschikbaar zijn. Bovendien 
is een vereiste voor het samenstellen van klantenbestanden dat het mogelijk 
is om te identificeren welk accountantskantoor, vestiging en partner verant-
woordelijk zijn voor een accountantscontrole. Verder zijn gegevens over de 
expertise van accountants alsmede financiële gegevens vereist. Ten slotte 
zijn gegevens nodig over de geografische locaties van accountants en klan-
ten, om de mate van concurrentie binnen lokale markten te bepalen. Aange-
zien de Belgische markt voor accountantscontroles aan al deze eisen vol-
doet, is dit een geschikte markt voor de studies in dit proefschrift. Voor de 
onderzoeken is daarom een dataset verzameld bestaande uit gegevens over 
alle accountantscontroles die uitgevoerd zijn in België tussen 1998 en 2006. 
De benodigde gegevens zijn verkregen via drie verschillende bronnen. Fi-
nanciële gegevens zijn beschikbaar in de Bel-First databank. Gegevens over 
accountants zijn verkregen middels ledenlijsten van het Belgische instituut 
van de bedrijfsrevisoren (IBR). Tenslotte is gebruik gemaakt van Google 
Earth om geografische locaties van accountantskantoren en klanten te bepa-
len. 
Zoals aangegeven onderzoekt het eerste empirische stuk of accoun-
tantskantoren gebruik maken van de verschillen in ervaringsniveaus van 
partners als een strategie voor risicobeheersing. Accountantskantoren kun-
nen de risico‟s verbonden aan accountantscontroles beheersen door mid-
dels van het toewijzen van partners met hogere mates van expertise aan 
meer risicovolle klanten. Bovendien vereisen controlestandaarden dat 
controleteams over voldoende ervaring beschikken. Ondanks dat het voor 
accountantskantoren van belang is dat partners met de meeste expertise 
worden toegewezen aan de meest risicovolle klanten, is het nog maar de 
vraag of dit in de praktijk gebeurt. Ten eerste is het toewijzingsproces van 
partners aan klanten erg complex vanwege de verschillen in 
ervaringsniveaus van partners en de variatie in risico karakteristieken van 
klanten. Tevens is risico aversie van partners mogelijk van negatieve invloed 
op hun bereidheid om risicovolle klanten te controleren. Dit zou er toe 
Summary in Dutch 
 
152 
 
kunnen leiden dat relatief onervaren partners worden toegewezen aan de 
meeste risicovolle klanten. 
Gebaseerd op voorgaand onderzoek onderscheidt deze studie twee ver-
schillende maatstaven van expertise: algemene ervaring en branche speci-
fieke ervaring. Drie verschillende typen risico‟s worden geanalyseerd: ac-
countantscontrolerisico, ondernemingsrisico van klanten, en onder-
nemingsrisico van accountants. Accountantscontrolerisico en ondernemings-
risico van klanten worden gemeten aan de hand van financiële gegevens. 
Ondernemingsrisico van de accountant is afhankelijk van de vraag of een 
klant al dan niet beursgenoteerd is. 
De resultaten laten zien dat accountants gebruik maken van algemene 
ervaring van partners, om het ondernemingsrisico van de accountant te be-
perken. De toewijzing van partners met meer branchespecifieke ervaring 
wordt gebruikt als strategie voor beheersing van accountantscontrolerisico. 
Er is geen bewijs gevonden voor de verwachting dat expertise van partners 
wordt gebruikt om het ondernemingsrisico van klanten te beperken. In zijn 
geheel genomen tonen de resultaten dat accountants gebruik maken exper-
tise van partners als strategie voor risicobeheersing. Hier moet wel de kant-
tekening bij geplaatst worden dat ervaren partners wellicht ervoor kiezen om 
klanten met een hoog ondernemingsrisico voor de accountant te controleren 
vanwege prestige en carrière ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden verbonden met de 
controle van beursgenoteerde ondernemingen. 
Het tweede empirische stuk bestudeert of economische afhankelijkheid 
van klanten de kwaliteit van accountantscontroles beïnvloedt. Accountants-
honoraria kunnen leiden tot een economische band tussen de accountant en 
de klant. Dit zorgt er mogelijk voor dat de accountant minder onafhankelijk is 
van de klant, wat een lagere kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole ten gevol-
ge zal hebben. Dit probleem speelt voornamelijk bij klanten die een relatief 
hoog honorarium betalen. In het geval dat de jaarrekening zoals goedge-
keurd door de accountant materiële afwijkingen bevat kan dit nadelige effec-
ten hebben op de reputatie van de accountant en bovendien kan de accoun-
tant aangeklaagd worden. Deze mogelijke gevolgen geven een stimulans 
voor de accountant om zich onafhankelijk op te blijven stellen, ongeacht de 
hoogte van het controlehonorarium (Reynolds en Francis 2001).  
Aangezien problemen met betrekking tot verminderde onafhankelijkheid 
zich eerder voordoen op partner of lokaal kantoor niveau dan op het niveau 
van de gehele accountantsorganisitie, bestudeert deze studie de gevolgen 
van economische afhankelijkheid op de kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole 
op deze drie niveaus. Verder onderscheidt de studie ondernemingen die hun 
winsten naar boven sturen van ondernemingen die hun winsten naar bene-
den sturen. Dit verschil is van belang, aangezien de belastingdienst een 
hogere prioriteit geeft aan het controleren van jaarverslagen van onderne-
mingen controleert die hun winsten naar beneden sturen dan aan het 
controleren van jaarverslagen van ondernemingen die hun winsten naar 
boven sturen. Gegeven dat de Belgische markt een beperkt aansprakelijk-
heidsrisico kent, creëert dit de mogelijkheid om te bestuderen of reputatie 
effecten voldoende zijn voor accountantskantoren om zich onafhankelijk op 
te stellen, of dat er een behoefte is aan een publieke toezichthouder. 
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Gebaseerd op eerder onderzoek maakt deze studie gebruik van een li-
neaire regressie om het effect van economische afhankelijkheid op de kwali-
teit van de accountantscontrole te onderzoeken. Economische afhankelijk 
wordt gemeten op basis van de relatieve grootte van klanten binnen het 
klantenbestand van een accountant. De kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole 
wordt gemeten aan de hand van korte termijn accruals.  
De resultaten van deze studie tonen aan dat economische af-
hankelijkheid een lagere kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole ten gevolge 
heeft. Deze bevinding is echter alleen van toepassing voor ondernemingen 
die hun winsten naar boven sturen. Accountants laten niet meer ruimte toe 
voor ondernemingen die hun winsten naar beneden sturen. Deze bevinding 
suggereert dat er een rol is weggelegd voor een publieke toezichthouder om 
de kwaliteit van accountantscontroles te garanderen. De resultaten tonen 
geen bewijs dat problemen qua onafhankelijkheid zich eerder voordoen op 
het niveau van de partner dan op het niveau van de accountantsorganisatie. 
Dit kan mogelijk verklaard worden door de geringe groottes van accoun-
tantskantoren in België. 
Het laatste empirische stuk bestudeert het effect van concurrentie op de 
kwaliteit van de controle. Vanwege de hoge mate van concentratie wordt de 
markt voor accountantscontroles vaak bekritiseerd als zijnde een markt met 
beperkte concurrentie (e.g. Government Accountability Office 2003; 
Financial Stability Forum 2006). De algemene verwachting is dat een 
beperkte mate van concurrentie op een markt leidt tot een lage kwaliteit. Het 
is echter onduidelijk of dit ook van toepassing is op de markt voor accoun-
tantscontroles. Voorgaand onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat een hoge 
marktconcentratie niet per definitie gelijk staat aan een lage mate van 
concurrentie (Buijink et al. 1998). Bovendien is het niet duidelijk of standaard 
economische theoriën betreffende concurrentie en kwaliteit van toepassing 
zijn op accountantscontroles aangezien de kwaliteit van accountantscontro-
les niet direct waarneembaar is en bovendien is de markt voor accountants-
controles strikt gereguleerd. 
In lijn met voorgaand onderzoek maakt de studie gebruik van de Herfin-
dahl-index om de mate van marktconcentratie te meten. Tevens wordt een 
maatstaf van marktaandeel mobiliteit gebruikt om de mate van concurrentie 
te meten. Een tweede maatstaf van concurrentie, concurrentiedichtheid, 
wordt in deze studie geintroduceerd. Net zoals in de tweede studie maakt 
deze studie gebruik van korte termijn accruals om de kwaliteit van accoun-
tantscontroles te meten. 
De resultaten van deze studie laten een negatief verband zien tussen 
marktconcentratie en de kwaliteit van accountantscontroles. Teven toont de 
studie een positief verband tussen de mate van concurrentie op de markt 
voor accountantscontroles en de kwaliteit van accountantscontroles. Deze 
bevinding suggereert dat concurrentie op de markt voor accountants-
controles mogelijk is, ongeacht de hoge mate van marktconcentratie. 
Deze en verdere conclusies en aanbevelingen worden in hoofdstuk 5 
weergegeven. Dit hoofdstuk geeft tevens een overzicht van de beperkingen 
van het onderzoek en suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek. 
   
